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LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES IN ALASKA:
STATE V MINANO
I. INTRODUCTION
The lesser-included offense doctrine alters the decision making
process of a jury. Ordinarily, a jury can consider only whether a de-
fendant is guilty or not guilty of the specific crime for which he was
indicted.' The lesser-included offense doctrine, however, provides a
third option to juries convinced that a defendant is guilty of some
crime but not necessarily the crime charged.2 The jury can convict the
defendant of a less serious, uncharged offense that has some of the
elements of the more serious, charged offense. Properly used, the doc-
trine offers several benefits. First, juries are more likely to focus on
disputed facts and render more deliberate opinions when they realize
they have a choice of verdicts; second, fewer trials will result in hung
juries;3 third, fewer defendants will be acquitted when the prosecution
has produced evidence that they have committed some crime;4 and
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1. Article I, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution provides in part: "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a grand jury. . . ." This provision is identical to the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Federal courts consider felonies to be
"infamous crimes" within the meaning of the fifth amendment, because a felony con-
viction can result in incarceration for one year or more. Harvin v. United States, 445
F.2d 675, 677-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1980). Thus, grand jury
indictment is required before an accused can be brought to trial. Id. ALAsKA R.
CRIM. P. 7(a) codifies this principle.
An indictment also satisfies the constitutional requirement that a defendant "be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" against him. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11. See Russell v. United States, 376 U.S. 749, 763
(1962) (an indictment "contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged,
and sufficiently apprises the defendent of what he must be prepared to meet"); see also
Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528, 530 (Alaska 1974).
2. The doctrine of lesser-included offenses is an exception to the general rule that
a defendant may be tried only on charges for which he was indicted. An indictment
for a greater or more serious charge by definition provides notice to a defendant that
he may be called to defend a lesser charge. Thus, a defendant is deemed to be on
notice of any lesser-included offenses. Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
3. For a discussion of the use of lesser-included offense instructions to reduce
hung juries see Note, Improving Jury Deliberations: A Reconsideration of Lesser In-
cluded Offense Instructions, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1983).
4. Studies conducted with mock juries suggest that acquittals occur almost twice
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fourth, a defendant's punishment will fit his crime more closely.
Lesser-included offense instructions do, however, present some
problems. Overuse of the doctrine could encourage unsound compro-
mise verdicts, confuse juries by presenting them with too many unre-
lated alternatives and thereby produce irrational decisions, and
impede the orderly administration of trials. For these reasons, it is
critical that the courts adopt an appropriately tailored lesser-included
offense doctrine. This task, however, is not easily accomplished. As
one court has recognized, "[t]he doctrine of lesser included offenses is
not without difficulty in any area of criminal law."'5
The Alaska Supreme Court has recently readdressed the appro-
priateness of its standard for identifying lesser-included offenses. In
State v. Minano,6 the court explicitly rejected recent holdings of the
Alaska Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court that al-
lowed the jury to be given instructions for related as well as lesser-
included offenses.7 Moreover, the Minano court reaffirmed the stan-
dard it had set out in Elisovsky v. State 8 by stating that the decision to
instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense should be "viewed from the
perspective of the facts charged in the indictment, in light of the evi-
dence actually presented."9 In so holding, the court appears to have
overturned the more flexible evidence-based standard generally em-
ployed by the court of appeals after Elisovsky. The implications of the
Minano court's decision, however, are not entirely clear because of
some inconsistencies in the opinion and the uncertainty of the opin-
ion's language.
This note first discusses the origins of and rationale for the lesser-
included offense doctrine. Second, because Alaska law in this area
draws in large part on the jurisprudence of other states, several of the
standards used in the federal and state courts will be set out and the
policy implications of those standards will be analyzed. Third, this
note will trace the history of the doctrine in Alaska. This note then
discusses the supreme court's decision in Minano which rejected the
related offense approach proposed by the court of appeals as a new
as often when a jury does not have an alternative to the choice between guilt and
innocence. See Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social
Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 211,
214 (1972); B. SALES, THE TRIAL PROCESS 317-24 (1981).
5. Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969).
6. 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985).
7. Id. at 1016; see Minano v. State, 690 P.2d 28 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), rev'd,
710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985); People v. Geiger, 35 Cal. 3d 510, 674 P.2d 1303, 199
Cal. Rptr. 45 (1984).
8. 592 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1979).
9. Minano, 710 P.2d at 1016 (citing Elisovsky, 592 P.2d at 1226).
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standard for Alaska. The note next discusses the confusion resulting
from the Minano court's failure to clearly identify the proper standard
for Alaska courts to use in applying the lesser-included offense doc-
trine. Finally, this note recommends that the rules committee review-
ing Alaska's rule on lesser-included offenses not alter the current rule
so as to permit the related offense approach. Instead, either the rules
committee or the Alaska Supreme Court should adopt the evidence
approach as the standard to be applied by Alaska courts in the area of
lesser-included offenses.
II. THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED
STATES
At common law a jury was allowed, but not required, to convict
the defendant of any lesser crime necessarily included in the crime
charged and supported by the evidence at trial. 10 In 1872 Congress
codified this doctrine as part of the rules governing federal criminal
trials,11 and many states have subsequently adopted similiar statutes. 12
The original rationale for lesser-included offense instructions was to
"prevent the prosecution from failing where some element of the crime
charged was not made out."'1 3 Later cases, however, recognized that
defendants as well as prosecutors benefit from requesting such instruc-
tions. 14 The doctrine allows defendants access to the "mercy dispens-
ing power" of the jury15 by affording the jury an alternative to a guilty
verdict on the greater offense when the evidence indicates that the de-
fendant is guilty of some crime. 16 The lesser offense effectively be-
10. 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 301-02 (1847); 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 1716-1721, at 439-440 (Glazebrook ed. 1973).
11. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255 § 9, 17 Stat. 197, 198 (current version at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 31(c)).
12. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRuM. P. 31(c), set forth at text accompanying note 69.
13. Kelly v. United States, 370 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 913 (1967) (quoting People v. Mussender, 308 N.Y. 558, 562, 127 N.E.2d 551,
553 (1955)).
14. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980).
15. Kelly, 370 F.2d at 229; see also People v. Clemente, 285 A.D. 258, 264, 136
N.Y.S.2d 202, 207 (1954) (jury entitled to consider tender mercies to convict defend-
ant of a lesser crime even when the evidence clearly warrants conviction of the greater
crime).
16. True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is
offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal.
But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction . . . precisely be-
cause he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice
will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury
is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212 (1973) (emphasis in original).
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comes part of the defense to the greater crime; the defendant argues
that he did not commit crime X because he only committed crime Y.17
As defendants realized the advantages of the lesser-included of-
fense doctrine, they began to seek constitutional support for a require-
ment that such instructions be given. Some commentators and state
courts have reasoned that the doctrine is part of the defendant's sixth
amendment right to have the jury determine all factual issues
presented in his case. 18 Other cases have attempted to find a right to
such instructions in the due process clause.' 9 United States Supreme
Court decisions, however, have failed to clarify whether a defendant
may claim a constitutional right to receive lesser-included offense
instructions.
In Beck v. Alabama,20 the Court declared unconstitutional a state
statute that prohibited lesser-included offense instructions in capital
cases.21 The Court reasoned that restricting a jury's options may in-
crease the risk of an unwarranted conviction and introduce irrelevant
considerations into the fact-finding process. 22 Although its reasoning
would seem to apply to all criminal cases, the Court noted significant
differences between capital and other criminal cases and reiterated a
statement first made in Keeble v. United States23 that it had "never
held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction
as a matter of due process." 24
The failure of the Supreme Court to clearly articulate its rationale
for granting the defendant a lesser-included offense instruction in Beck
has caused confusion among other state and federal courts as to the
exact nature of the doctrine. For example, some state courts have em-
ployed the reasoning of Beck to conclude that the fundamental fair-
ness mandate of due process grants defendants a right to both lesser-
included and related offense instructions in all criminal cases. 25
Without a clear constitutional foundation or a consistent policy
rationale, the lesser-included offense doctrine has spawned a multiplic-
ity of definitions and applications in both the state and federal courts.
17. See Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1961) (failure to give
lesser-included offense instruction supported by evidence is reversible error because it
"withdraws from the jury a measure of defense to which the defendant is entitled").
18. See Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine: Problems with Its Use, 3
LAND & WATER L. REv. 587, 591 (1968); see also People v. Chamblis, 395 Mich.
408, 420-21, 236 N.W.2d 473, 479 (1975).
19. George, Lesser Included Offenses in Michigan, 1975 DET. C.L. REv. 35, 39.
20. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
21. Id. at 627.
22. Id. at 642-43.
23. 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973).
24. Beck, 447 U.S. at 37.
25. See, e.g., People v. Geiger, 35 Cal. 3d 510, 518-20, 674 P.2d 1303, 1306-08,
199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48-50 (1984).
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The most prominent of the approaches used to evaluate the propriety
of lesser-included offense instructions are the "strict statutory ap-
proach," the "pleadings approach," and certain more lenient factual
standards. 26
A. The Strict Statutory Approach
The strict statutory approach is the most restrictive method used
to identify potential lesser-included offenses. This test compares the
statutory definition of two offenses.27 If "the [statutory] elements of
the lesser offense are identical to part of the elements of the greater
offense," then a lesser-included offense instruction may be appropri-
ate.2 8 In comparing the elements of the crimes, a court must ignore
the evidence produced at trial even if such evidence proves that in the
course of allegedly committing the greater offense this particular de-
fendant must have committed a lesser crime. The appropriate inquiry
is whether the defendant could ever commit the greater crime without
also committing the lesser.29 For example, a court applying this stan-
dard would never find careless use of firearms to be a lesser-included
offense of assault with a dangerous weapon because it is possible to
commit assault with a weapon other than a firearm 0
The strict statutory approach is advocated by both state and fed-
eral courts that adhere closely to the common law conception of the
26. Irrespective of the standard used to identify potential lesser-included offenses,
a lesser-included offense must satisfy two additional requirements before it may be
given as an instruction to the jury. First, the record must contain sufficient evidence
of the lesser crime to allow a jury to convict the defendant of that crime. See, e.g.,
Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610 (1982). In other words, a lesser-included offense
instruction would not be appropriate if the accused's only defense to the crime
charged consisted of a challenge to the evidence identifying the perpetrator, so that
either the defendant is guilty of the crime charged or he is not guilty at all. See Baden
v. State, 667 P.2d 1275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). This requirement ensures that a jury
does not engage in undue compromise by convicting the defendant of a lesser crime
even though the evidence does not support conviction on that charge, merely because
it could not agree as to guilt or innocence of the greater charge. See Hopper, 456 U.S.
at 611.
Second, there must be a factual dispute as to an element required to establish
commission of the greater offense but not to establish commission of the lesser. See
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350 (1965). To show a sufficient factual dis-
pute the record must contain "some evidence" that could lead a reasonable jury to
determine that the necessary element has not been proved. See Nathaniel v. State, 668
P.2d 851, 854 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). This evidentiary standard requires "more than
a scintilla [of evidence] but less than that which would compel reasonable doubt as a
matter of law." Id. at 855.
27. See Virgin Islands v. Parrilla, 550 F.2d 879, 881 (3d Cir. 1977).
28. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 88 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981).
29. Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 1967).
30. Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Alaska 1979).
1986]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
role of lesser-included offenses. Because the purpose of the common
law rule was to aid the prosecution, courts adhering to this conception
of the rule would allow a defendant to request a lesser-included offense
instruction only when a prosecutor could also invoke the doctrine.31
This requirement of mutuality significantly limits the number of
lesser-included offenses for which the defendant can argue because the
prosecution is constitutionally limited to offenses of which the defend-
ant has notice by way of the indictment. 32
The limited use of lesser-included offense instructions allowed by
the strict statutory standard is also most consistent with the literal
language of most federal and state criminal rules33 codifying the com-
mon law. These rules require a lesser offense to be "necessarily in-
cluded" in the greater offense before a court can offer an instruction.
The advantages of the strict statutory approach derive from its
simple application. 34 The pure strict statutory approach does not de-
pend in any way on the facts determined at trial, so that state courts
need only categorize the relationship of two offenses, and then apply
that relationship in all subsequent cases. All defendants then charged
with the offense in question will receive identical rights to lesser-
included offense instructions. Thus, a major virtue of the strict statu-
tory approach is that it clearly places both defendants and prosecutors
on notice of any lesser-included offense instructions that a court might
possibly give. Additionally, this standard promotes orderly trials be-
cause it encourages parties to develop the case at hand rather than
encouraging them "to manipulate the proof to accommodate as wide a
range of conclusions as possible."'35
Unfortunately, the strict statutory approach's strengths are also
the source of its weaknesses. Its simplistic analysis and inflexibility
prevent a jury from adapting the punishment of a criminal to the
crime actually committed as established by the facts at trial. This defi-
31. Kelly, 370 F.2d at 229. (The purpose of the 1872 statute that created federal
Rule 31(c) was to aid the prosecution; therefore, any right the defendant has cannot
extend beyond the right of the prosecutor to invoke the doctrine.).
32. A defendant is constitutionally entitled to have notice of the charges against
him. See supra note 1.
33. Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codified the common
law and is the foundation for most state rules. The rule provides:
The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the
offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an
offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense.
34. See United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1238 (9th Cir. 1980) ("the
mechanical comparison of statutory elements. . . may be appealing in its promise of
certainty and intellectual purity").
35. Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included Offense, 50
BROOKLYN L. Rav. 191, 201 (1984); see also Virgin Islands v. Smith, 558 F.2d 691,
695-96 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977).
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ciency has become more significant in recent years because of the in-
creasing number of statutes that can be applied to a single criminal
act. Some jurisdictions seeking a more realistic matching of the of-
fenses on which a jury is instructed and the facts of a case have aban-
doned the strict statutory approach.
B. The Pleadings Approach
Attempting to alleviate some of the inflexibility of the strict statu-
tory approach, many state courts36 expanded the lesser-included of-
fense doctrine to allow an examination of the facts in the indictment.
If some but not all of those facts would, if established, constitute a
lesser offense, an instruction on such offense is appropriate.3 7 As ar-
ticulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Brown,38 the
pleadings approach retains the "necessary inclusion" requirement.
"The test. . . is whether it is possible to commit the greater offense in
the manner alleged in the information or bill of particulars, without
having first committed the lesser. If it is possible, then the lesser viola-
tion is not an included crime." 39
The pleadings approach attempts to take an intermediate position
between the strict statutory approach and the more lenient factual ap-
proaches discussed below.40 It resembles the statutory approach by
providing both the prosecutor and the defendant with notice of poten-
tial lesser-included offenses. The parties are operating from a closed
set of facts specified in the indictment, and consequently both parties
can fairly assess all of the possible implications of proving different
portions of the indictment's facts at trial. The parties can thus be
deemed to have notice of potential lesser-included offenses. Moreover,
neither party gains any undue advantage because all potential lesser-
included offenses are fixed in advance of trial. As with the strict statu-
tory approach, neither party is encouraged to engage in unfocused and
speculative argument at trial. In sum, the pleadings approach retains
many of the advantages of the strict statutory approach while at the
same time refocusing the court's attention on the facts of the case.
36. No federal courts have adopted the pleadings approach. Although the Sev-
enth Circuit endorsed its application in one case, United States v. Stavros, 597 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1979), it subsequently has adopted a modified evidence approach.
United States v. Cova, 755 F.2d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 1985).
37. In re Maricopa County, 111 Ariz. 103, 105, 523 P.2d 1304, 1306 (1974); see
also, Nye v. State, 256 Ind. 219, 267 N.E.2d 842 (1971).
38. 163 Conn. 52, 301 A.2d 547 (1972), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 427 A.2d 414 (1984).
39. Id. at 61-62, 301 A.2d at 552 (emphasis added).
40. Johnson, 637 F.2d at 1238 (citing Stavros, 597 F.2d at 112) ("An intermediate
position of sorts appears to have been adopted by the Seventh Circuit in which the
primary focus is on the facts alleged in the indictment.").
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The pleadings approach is, however, vulnerable to several criti-
cisms. First, its results might not differ significantly from those of the
strict statutory approach. Most jurisdictions have abandoned require-
ments that the indictment set out the circumstances of the offense and
the theories of the prosecution as to how it was committed.41 Using
the indictment more to provide the defendant with notice of the crime
against which he must defend himself than to state the facts suggesting
the defendant's involvement, most jurisdictions generally hold that an
indictment is sufficiently detailed if it sets forth the offense in its statu-
tory language.42 Thus, in most jurisdictions the distinctions between
the statutory elements approach and the pleadings approach have lost
their significance.
Second, the pleadings approach places the availability of lesser-
included offense instructions forever under the effective control of the
prosecutor because he has the power to limit such instructions by
drafting the indictment more generally.43 Third, even if the prosecu-
tor does not intend to limit the availability of lesser-included offense
instructions, the availability of such instructions will still depend on
the arbitrary fact of a particular prosecutor's general or specific draft-
ing style, thus making instructions available to some defendants but
denying them to others charged with the same crime.44
C. The Lenient Factual Approaches
Recognizing the artificial focus of both the statutory elements and
pleadings approaches, some jurisdictions have expanded their tests to
allow lesser-included offense instructions when the elements of the
lesser offense are established by the evidence at trial, even though all
such elements are not included in the statutory definition of the
greater offense or in the indictment. The standards set forth by these
41. See Cowan v. State, 140 Neb. 847, 2 N.W.2d 111 (1942) (indictment need not
set out detailed particulars of crime as required by common law); Thomas v. State,
522 P.2d 528, 530-31 (Alaska 1974); Williams v. State, 648 P.2d 603, 605-06 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1982).
42. See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 389 P.2d 915, 916 (Alaska 1964) ("it is enough to
allege the offense substantially in the language of the statute"); People v. Docherty,
178 Cal. App. 2d 33, 39, 2 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1960).
43. Johnson, 637 P.2d at 1239 ("Indeed if we restricted ourselves to an examina-
tion of the indictment alone, the prosecution would have the power to limit the de-
fendant's entitlement to such instructions at the very outset of the proceedings.")
44. See Barnett, The Lesser-Included Offense Doctrine: A Present Day Analysis for
Practitioners, 5 CoNN. L. Rnv. 255, 264-66 (1972) (discussing two cases with similiar
facts but different conclusions on the question of lesser-included offense instructions
because of differing degrees of specificity in the indictment); see also Brief for Peti-
tioner at 15 n.3, Minano v. State, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985) (state argues that
under the pleadings approach lesser-included offense instruction is determined "by the
drafting style of the prosecuting attorney who presented the case at grand jury").
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jurisdictions can be divided into two classes: the evidence approach,
advocated by several state courts, 45 and the related offense approach,
originally advocated by three federal circuits. 46
1. The Evidence Approach. Courts using the evidence approach
expressly retain the requirement that an offense be necessarily in-
cluded in the offense charged but interpret this to mean that on the
facts of the case it would be impossible for the defendant to have com-
mitted the crime charged without also committing the lesser crime.47
An Iowa case illustrates the application of this standard. In State v.
Hawkins48 the defendant was charged with larceny of a motor vehicle.
Evidence produced at trial showed that the defendant had taken the
car of another and was observed driving the vehicle.49 On this evi-
dence, the court determined that operating a motor vehicle without
consent was a lesser-included offense of larceny of a motor vehicle.50
This result could be reached only under the evidence approach.
Courts employing the strict statutory test would not allow such an
instruction because a vehicle may be taken by means other than driv-
ing.5 1 Moreover, courts following the pleadings approach would also
invalidate such an instruction if the indictment had not specifically
alleged that the defendant drove the car away.52
Because the appropriateness of any lesser-included offense in-
structions is determined at the close of the evidence, a potential prob-
lem with the evidence approach is its inability to provide the defendant
with sufficient notice of the lesser offense.53 To alleviate this problem,
some courts allow only the defendant to request instructions on of-
45. See, e.g., People v. Dace, 104 Ill. 2d 96, 470 N.E.2d 993 (1984); State v. Haw-
kins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973); People v. Cionek, 43 A.D.2d 256, 351 N.Y.S.2d
177 (1974); Anderson v. State, 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
46. See United States v. Pino, 606 F.2d 908, 910-17 (10th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d
314 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
47. See, e.g., People v. Dace, 104 Ill. 2d 96, 470 N.E.2d 933 (1984); People v.
Cionek, 43 A.D.2d 256, 351 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1974).
48. 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973).
49. Id. at 556.
50. Id. at 557-58.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40. While the Hawkins court did not
explicitly address the issue of the specificity required in the indictment, it expressly
overruled its decision in State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968). Hawkins, 203
N.W.2d at 557. The Everett court had concluded that if the indictment did not specify
that a defendant drove the automobile away, operating a motor vehicle without con-
sent would not be a lesser-included offense of larceny of a motor vehicle. Everett, 157
N.W.2d at 148.
53. For a discussion of the defendant's right to notice of the charges against him
see supra note 1.
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fenses not fairly implied from the indictment.5 4 The defendant's re-
quest does not violate his constitutional right to notice of the offenses
charged because the defendant waives his right to notice by requesting
such instructions. 55
2. The Related Offense Approach. As originally conceived, the re-
lated offense approach was not intended as an alternative to the evi-
dence approach but rather as an alternative to the strict statutory and
pleadings approaches. Premised explicitly on the assumption that a
defendant has a broader right to lesser-included offense instructions
than does the prosecutor,5 6 the related offense doctrine grants a de-
fendant instructions on offenses that, although not included in the of-
fense charged, are inherently related to that offense. Offenses are
inherently related when they "relate to the protection of the same in-
terests" and they are "so related that in the general nature of these
crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense is
necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the
greater offense."'57
The language of this approach is seemingly very broad, and con-
sequently its outermost parameters are unclear because it has never
been applied in a situation that would not also have satisfied the evi-
dence approach.58 Potential differences between the approaches, how-
ever, can be anticipated.5 9 The evidence approach requires that any
elements of the lesser offense that are not identical to the statutory
elements of the greater offense be uncontested and clearly established
by the evidence presented at trial. If the evidence does not conclu-
sively establish the additional element, it would bepossible for the de-
54. See, eg., Anderson v. State, 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
55. Id. at 555.
56. Whitaker, 447 F.2d at 321.
57. Id. at 319. The California Supreme Court has a similiar definition of the rela-
tionship required for "closely related" offenses. According to that court, an offense is
closely related when evidence establishing it is "relevant to and admitted for the pur-
pose of establishing whether the defendant is guilty of the charged offense." People v.
Geiger, 35 Cal. 3d 510, 531, 674 P.2d 1303, 1316, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 58 (1984).
58. In Whitaker the court concluded that unlawful entry was a lesser-included
offense in the crime of burglary when the evidence clearly established unlawful entry.
447 F.2d at 319. See also Johnson, 637 F.2d at 1234-35 (assault with a dangerous
weapon is a lesser-included offense of assault resulting in serious bodily injury where
evidence at trial conclusively established that defendant used an axe to inflict the in-
jury); Pino, 606 F.2d at 916-17 (careless operation of a motor vehicle was a lesser-
included offense of involuntary manslaughter when evidence of defendant's operation
of a motor vehicle, collision, and victim's death were all established at trial); Geiger,
35 Cal. 3d at 516-17, 674 P.2d at 1315-16, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 57-58 (vandalism was
chargeable as a lesser offense when defendant had been indicted for burglary and it
was undisputed that defendant had broken a shop window).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 97-110.
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fendant to have committed the greater offense without also having
committed the lesser. Thus, the greater offense would not neccessarily
include the lesser offense, rendering an instruction on the lesser offense
inappropriate. The related offense approach has no requirement that
the lesser offense be necessarily included within the greater offense and
accordingly seems to permit instructions whenever the evidence
presented might support the additional elements of the lesser offense.
Although the related offense doctrine generally increases the
number of offenses on which a jury may be instructed, its requirement
that the offenses relate to the protection of the same interests may op-
erate to exclude instructions on what might otherwise be classified as
lesser-included offenses. In State v. Gopher,60 the evidence presented
by the state clearly established that the defendant had committed the
offense of resisting arrest, but a question existed as to whether the de-
fendant had intended to cause physical injury and could be convicted
of the charged crime of assault. 61 The state argued that the court
should apply the inherent relationship test and that under that test no
instruction should be granted because the offenses were designed to
protect different societal interests. Punishment of assault protects the
safety of police officers while laws criminalizing the resisting of arrest
protect society's interest in orderly arrests.62 The Montana Supreme
Court found, however, that the important relationship-between the of-
fenses was their factual relationship in the case at hand, not the rela-
tionship of the statutes defining the elements of the offenses. The
court then applied the traditional evidence approach analysis to allow
an instruction on the lesser-included offense of resisting arrest.63
In addition to the related offense approach's somewhat artificial
focus on the interests protected by the statutes, the approach could
upset the operation of the lesser-included offense doctrine. Typically,
committing a lesser offense is an integral step in any commission of the
greater offense.64 If a jury believes that a defendant has committed
any crime, it can first find him guilty of the lesser charge and then
focus on whether the prosecutor has proved the additional, disputed
fact necessary to convict the defendant of the greater crime. Under
the related offense doctrine, the jury cannot consider the lesser and
greater crimes at the same time because the lesser crime has addi-
tional, disputed elements that are not required for conviction of the
greater offense.65 Without the building block relationship between of-
60. 633 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1981).
61. Id. at 1197.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1961).
65. In holding that an instruction requiring the jury to unanimously agree on the
greater crime before it considers the lesser-included offense did not contravene the
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fenses, the potential for jury confusion and irrational verdicts is
manifest.66
The implications and efficacy of the related offense approach and
of the other lesser-included offense standards are significant because
Alaska has employed each of these four standards at some point in
time. The analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of each standard,
then, lays the groundwork for an analysis of the appropriate lesser-
included offense standard for the Alaska courts.
III. EVOLUTION OF ALASKA'S APPROACH TO LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSES
Rule 31(c) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
governs lesser-included offense instructions, 67 derives from the com-
mon law.68 It provides in pertinent part, "The defendant may be
found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense
charged. ' 69 Although the language of the Alaska rule, like that of the
federal rule,70 suggests that its use is discretionary, the Alaska
Supreme Court has intimated that such instructions are part of the
defendant's constitutional right to have a jury determine all questions
of fact, even those relating to the degree of an offense. 71 Failure to
grant a party a lesser-included offense instruction when properly re-
quested constitutes reversible error.72
rationale for giving lesser-included offense instructions, the Alaska Court of Appeals,
in Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (petition for hearing
granted), stated:
[A] lesser-included offense by definition is included in the greater offense.
Consequently, a jury cannot consider the elements of the greater offense
without simultaneously considering the elements of the lesser-included of-
fense. . . . We recognize, however, that Alaska has adopted the cognate
approach to lesser-included offenses and that cases could arise in which the
relationship between the greater and the lesser-included offenses might be
less clear. Marker v. State, 692 P.2d 977 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Minano v.
State, 690 P.2d 28 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). In the instant case, we find noth-
ing obscure or potentially confusing in the relationship between the various
offenses and no circumstances to indicate that the instructions misled the
jury.
Dresnek, 697 P.2d at 1062-63.
66. See id.
67. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
68. Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Alaska 1979).
69. ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
70. Alaska's rule is substantially identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c), set forth
supra at note 33. See also supra text accompanying notes 10-24 for a discussion of the
federal right to lesser-included offense instructions.
71. Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 318 n.24 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Gallegos v.
People, 136 Colo. 321, 323-24, 316 P.2d 884, 885 (1957)).
72. See, e.g., Elisovsky, 592 P.2d at 1226; Nathaniel v. State, 668 P.2d 851, 856
(Alaska 1983).
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The Alaska Supreme Court has consistently held that for an of-
fense to be "necessarily included" in the offense charged, it must be
"impossible to commit the greater [offense] without first having com-
mitted the lesser."' 73 Early decisions interpreted this mandate to re-
quire the strict statutory elements analysis. 74 This supposedly simple
approach, however, failed to achieve one of its chief goals - judicial
economy. Its blind focus on the statutory elements of the offenses en-
couraged prosecutors to stretch statutory language so as to create ad-
ditional elements in the lesser offenses that would bar application of
the lesser-included offense doctrine. 75
In Christie v. State76 the supreme court adopted a different defini-
tion of necessarily included offenses. The state argued in Christie that
careless use of a firearm could not be a lesser-included offense of shoot-
ing, stabbing, or cutting with intent to kill because it was possible to
commit the greater crime by cutting or stabbing, thereby not commit-
ting the lesser crime.77 The court rejected this traditional statutory
elements argument stating, "The fact that there may be alternate
means of meeting the requirements of the greater statute is irrelevant
to the determination that, by the facts charged in the indictment, the
lesser crime is necessarily included in the greater. s78 The court thus
appeared to be moving toward the pleadings approach.
Elaborating on this standard a year later in Elisovsky v. State,79
the supreme court found support for the standard in a literal reading
of Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c), which "refers to 'the of-
fense charged,' not the statute under which the offense is charged." 80
The court labeled its new approach the "cognate approach" and em-
phasized that the approach focused "closely on the facts charged in
the indictment to determine whether the defendant had actual notice
of possible lesser-included offenses."' 81 Although the Elisovsky opinion
seems to be a classic statement of the pleadings approach, later courts
have interpreted the opinion as more of a statement of policy direction
73. Elisovsky, 592 P.2d at 1225; see also Christie, 580 P.2d at 317; Jennings v.
State, 404 P.2d 652, 655 (Alaska 1965); Mahle v. State, 392 P.2d 19, 21 n.6 (Alaska
1964).
74. See Jennings, 404 P.2d at 655; Mahle, 392 P.2d at 20-21.
75. For example, in Rivett v. State, 578 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Alaska 1978), the
supreme court rejected the state's argument that being unarmed is an element of mis-
demeanor assault and battery. This offense, therefore, could not be included in the
greater offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. If it was an element of the lesser
offense, the state would have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
76. 580 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1978).
77. Id. at 320 n.35.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. 592 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1979).
80. Id. at 1225.
81. Id. at 1226.
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than an articulation of a standard.8 2 Part of the resultant confusion
stemmed from using the label "cognate approach." Other authorities
have used this term to refer to the pleadings approach, the evidence
approach, and even the related offense approach.83
The uncertainty surrounding the Elisovsky opinion is evidenced
by the fact that the court of appeals has cited Elisovsky to support
conflicting approaches. In Nathaniel v. State,84 the court of appeals
interpreted Elisovsky to prescribe the evidence approach. In Nathan-
iel, the state, intending to prove first degree sexual assault, introduced
evidence that the victim had been physically injured to show that she
had not consented to the defendant's sexual advances. 85 Because the
state presented this evidence of physical injury, the court found fourth
degree assault to be a lesser-included offense of the charged crime -
first degree sexual assault - as proven at trial.86 The court made its
determination without mentioning whether the indictment specified
that the victim had been physically injured. The direction of the
court's inquiry away from the indictment and toward the evidence ad-
duced at trial is more clearly demonstrated in the court of appeals'
Minano decision.
Under the cognate approach the court must examine the evidence
that the state relied on as well as the statutory elements of the of-
fense to determine whether, in the context of the case, it would be
possible for the jury to find that the accused had committed the
greater offense but not the lesser offense.87
After Elisovsky, the Alaska Supreme Court also seemed to en-
dorse the evidence interpretation, stating in Tuckfield v. State8 that
"the governing principle is whether the facts in evidence demonstrate
one could have committed the greater offense without also having
committed the offense of lesser magnitude. '8 9 The supreme court de-
82. See infra text accompanying notes 84-90. See also Brief for Petitioner at 19,
State v. Minano, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985); Brief of Respondent Lord at 6, State v.
Minano, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985).
83. See Note, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Pennsylvania: Uncertainty
in the Courts, 84 DICK. L. REV. 125, 127-28 (1979) (cognate theory is alternative term
for the pleadings approach); People v. Chamblis, 395 Mich. 408, 418-19, 236 N.W.2d
473, 478 (1975) (using the cognate label in relation to approach combining elements of
evidence and related offense standards).
Moreover, although the Elisovsky court set out the requirements for a pleadings
approach and cited appropriate authority, it also referred to United States v. Whita-
ker, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which advocates the related offense approach.
84. 668 P.2d 851 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
85. Id. at 854.
86. Id. at 854 n.2.
87. Minano v. State, 690 P.2d 28, 31 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added),
rev'd, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985).
88. 621 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1981).
89. Id. at 1352.
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cision in Tuckfield, however, cannot be read as a definitive acceptance
of the evidence approach because the offense of assault with intent to
commit rape would be a lesser-included offense of the crime of rape
even under the restrictive statutory elements approach.90
In a recent series of cases, the court of appeals attempted to ex-
pand the lesser-included offense doctrine even further by abandoning
the requirement of necessary inclusion and allowing instructions on
closely related offenses. 91 Citing the related offense test first set out in
United States v. Whitaker,92 the court asserted that an instruction on a
lesser offense is appropriate when "the lesser offense is inherently re-
lated to the offense charged, so that proof of the greater would ordina-
rily - but not invariably - entail proof of the lesser."' 93 The court
noted that this expansion of the doctrine to include related offenses
was consistent with, and might even be required by, the policies of
reasonableness and fairness on which the lesser-included offense doc-
trine is premised.94 Moreover, the court has cited with approval the
due process reasoning of the California Supreme Court in People v.
Geiger:95
In doubtful situations, however, the determinative factor should be
whether the option to convict a defendant of a related offense is
reasonably necessary to insure that the jury is afforded the opportu-
nity to decide all material issues presented by the evidence in accord
with the defendant's theory of the case, where denial of that oppor-
tunity might undermine the reasonable doubt standard.96
IV. STATE V. MINANO
A. Decision by the Court of Appeals - Testing the Parameters of
the Inherent Relationship Approach
The first court of appeals case to suggest the related offense stan-
dard was Minano v. State. 97 The defendants in Minano were charged
with robbery98 and assault in the second degree 99 and a jury convicted
them of both offenses. They appealed their convictions on the grounds
90. Id.
91. Reynolds v. State, 706 P.2d 708 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Alley v. State, 704
P.2d 233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Marker v. State, 692 P.2d 977 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984); Minano v. State, 690 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 710 P.2d 1013
(Alaska 1985).
92. 447 F.2d at 321.
93. Marker, 692 P.2d at 983.
94. Id. at 983.
95. 35 Cal. 3d 510, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1984).
96. Marker, 692 P.2d at 983.
97. 690 P.2d 28 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985).
98. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.510 (1983).
99. Id. § 11.41.210.
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that they were entitled to lesser-included offense instructions on the
crimes of theft in the second degree"'0 and criminal mischief in the
third degree (joyriding).' 0' Additionally, they argued that assault in
the second degree is a lesser-included offense of robbery so that convic-
tion of both offenses was improper. 102 The court of appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court, concluding that under the evidence ap-
proach joyriding was necessarily included in the offense of robbery,
thus entitling the defendants to an instruction on the lesser offense.10 3
Although the court grounded its reversal on the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury on the joyriding offense, the court went on to discuss
the propriety of a theft instruction because it believed this issue was
likely to arise on retrial.1° 4 At this point the court began to explore
the parameters of the lesser-included offense doctrine.
Under Alaska law, the crimes of robbery and theft have different
intent requirements. Theft requires that a defendant intend to perma-
nently deprive another of property.105 First degree robbery, on the
other hand, has no such requirement. 06 It requires instead that a de-
fendant use force with "the intent to prevent or overcome resistance to
the taking of the property."' 0 7 As the court of appeals appropriately
noted:
100. Id. § 11.46.130(a)(1).
101. Id. § 11.46.484(a)(2).
102. Minano, 690 P.2d at 30. The state conceded error on this point; assault is
necessarily included in the offense of robbery. Id. at 33.
103. Id. at 31. The offense of joyriding consists of the unauthorized taking of an
automobile. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.484(a)(2) (1983). The elements of the crime of
robbery may be satisfied by the perpetrator's attempt at taking property. Id.
§ 11.41.510. Because the state had proven that a cab was taken, the defendants in
Minano could not possibly have committed the robbery without committing joyriding.
104. Minano, 690 P.2d at 32. In most jurisdictions theft is indisputably an element
of robbery because of the statutory definition of robbery; thus, a lesser-included of-
fense instruction is appropriate even under the strict statutory approach. For exam-
ple, in Pennsylvania, "a person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a
theft," he inflicts or threatens bodily injury. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 370 1(a)(1)
(Purdon 1983) (emphasis added); see also Note, supra note 83, at 125 n.3.
105. The Alaska theft provision, ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.100(1) (1983), requires
proof of an "intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property of an-
other to oneself or a third person" to support a conviction. ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.46.990(1)-(2) (1982), defines "appropriate" and "deprive" to describe the taking
of property permanently, for an extended period of time, or "under such circum-
stances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost."
106. Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
107. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.500(a), 510(d)(1) (1983).
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In light of these differences in intent and in light of the fact that the
taking in this case involved an automobile, it would in theory have
been possible to convict of robbery and acquit of theft. It is conceiv-
able that the jury could have found that Minano and Lord intended
to take the cab but did not intend to deprive [the cab driver] of it or
appropriate it from him in a permanent sense.1°8
Because the crime of theft was not necessarily included in the greater
crime of robbery, the court of appeals could not, consistent with the
evidence approach, classify theft as a lesser-included offense of robbery
on the facts of this case. The court of appeals recognized that "theft
may not technically be a lesser-included offense of robbery;" neverthe-
less, it held that the two offenses were "closely related" and that upon
retrial an instruction on theft in the second degree would be appropri-
ate.109 This holding is clearly consistent with the related offense ap-
proach and inconsistent with the evidence approach. Although the
court of appeals actually employed the related offense approach in
Minano, it did not clearly identify that approach as the standard it felt
Alaska courts should adopt. Minano's significance stemmed from
later court of appeals opinions that characterized its holding as an
adoption of the traditional related offense approach.' 10
B. Decision by the Alaska Supreme Court - Rejection of the
Related Offense Approach
The Alaska Supreme Court granted a petition for hearing to de-
termine whether a defendant can request instructions on offenses re-
lated to but not necessarily included in the crime charged."' In
rejecting the court of appeals' adoption of the related offense ap-
proach, the supreme court stated:
[Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c)] requires that the lesser
offense must be one "necessarily included in the offense charged."
Whether the lesser offense is necessarily included is to be viewed
from the perspective of the facts charged in the indictment, in light
of the evidence actually presented.
In the present case, Minano and Lord may be guilty of the
offense charged in the indictment, robbery of Illguth by taking the
cab, without being guilty of the offense of theft. This would be the
case if the defendants did not intend to keep the cab either perma-
nently or for an extended period of time. Thus, the requirement of
Criminal Rule 31(c) that a lesser offense be one that is necessarily
included in the greater has not been met. 112
108. Minano, 690 P.2d at 33.
109. Id.
110. E.g., Reynolds, 706 P.2d at 710; Alley, 704 P.2d at 236; Marker, 692 P.2d at
983.
111. Minano v. State, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985).
112. Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).
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This passage represents the full extent of the court's analysis of
the lesser-included offense issue. The court reached its conclusion
solely through an interpretation of Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure
31(c) and did not consider whether the Alaska Constitution required
instructions on related offenses: 113
In reaching this decision we recognize that there may be good rea-
sons on both sides of the question of whether to amend Criminal
Rule 31(c) so that it extends to lesser related offenses. However, the
rule as it stands does not reach this far and it must be followed
unless and until it is changed.1 14
The Alaska Supreme Court in Minano correctly rejected the re-
lated offense doctrine. Its opinion leaves some doubts, however, re-
garding the current Alaska standard. It is not clear after Minano
whether Alaska intends to follow the pleadings approach or the evi-
dence approach. Alaska needs a clear, definitive standard that will
guide the trial courts and advance the policies underlying the lesser-
included offense doctrine.
V. AFTER MINANO: CONFUSION IN THE LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSE DOCTRINE
After the supreme court's 1979 opinion in Elisovsky and before
the court of appeals' Minano opinion and its progeny, the majority of
decisions interpreted Elisovsky as prescribing the evidence ap-
proach.' 15 In addition to rejecting the related offense approach, the
supreme court's opinion in Minano appears to have revised its applica-
tion of the evidence standard. The court articulated the standard for
lesser-included offenses as follows: "Whether the lesser offense is nec-
essarily included is to be viewed from the perspective of the facts
charged in the indictment, in light of the evidence actually
presented."1 16 This articulation suggests that the court is returning to
the pleadings approach. The phrase "in light of the evidence actually
presented" seems to refer to the second requirement of lesser-included
offenses - that they be supported by some evidence in the record -
and not to the standard for identifying lesser-included offenses. 1 7
The language of Minano suggests that the pleadings approach is
not being applied in its traditional manner. The court's use of the
phrase, "viewed from the perspective of the facts charged in the indict-
113. The court of appeals intimated in Marker that Alaska should follow Califor-
nia's reasoning that the defendant's due process rights entitle him to instructions on
related offenses. See supra text accompanying note 96. This issue was not argued to
or addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court.
114. Minano, 710 P.2d at 1016 (citations omitted).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
116. Minano, 710 P.2d at 1013.
117. See supra note 26.
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ment," suggests that the court will not require prosecutors to specifi-
cally plead all essential elements in the indictment for the greater
offense if such facts are fairly implied from the indictment. Indeed, if
the court was applying the traditional pleadings approach, it would
have objected to theft as a lesser-included offense on the additional
ground that Minano's and Lord's indictment failed to specify the value
of the property taken.' 18 When value effects the degree of an offense,
as it does in Alaska's theft statute, it must be specifically and carefully
pleaded or the indictment is deemed to constitute ineffective notice of
the crime the defendant must defend."19 The court's failure to men-
tion the value of property, an issue briefed and argued by both par-
ties,120 as a reason for rejecting the theft instruction confuses the
question of what approach the court was actually applying.
The standard articulated in Minano resembles neither the tradi-
tional pleadings approach nor the traditional evidence approach.
Without a clear standard, Alaska trial courts will have no guidance
concerning the appropriateness of lesser-included offense instructions,
and defendants and prosecutors will be unable to ascertain the precise
charges with respect to which they must prepare their arguments.
VI. A RECOMMENDATION FOR ALASKA: CONTINUED
PROSCRIPTION OF THE RELATED OFFENSE APPROACH
AND ADOPTION OF THE EVIDENCE APPROACH
The Alaska Rules Committee is currently considering whether
Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c) should be expanded to allow
jury instructions on related offenses.121 If the committee rejects the
related offense doctrine and retains the necessary inclusion require-
ment of the current rule, the Alaska courts must clarify the standard
for identifying such necessarily included offenses. The modified plead-
ings approach adopted by the supreme court in Minano is unclear and
does not achieve the goal of the lesser-included offense doctrine which
seeks a close match of the crime for which a defendant is convicted
and his illegal conduct. The evidence approach is superior to the
pleadings approach because it allows instructions on lesser-included
offenses established by the evidence at trial and is not limited to in-
118. This argument was made by the state to both the court of appeals, Minano,
690 P.2d at 32, and the supreme court, Brief for Petitioner at 36, Minano v. State, 710
P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985).
119. State v. Criss, 125 W. Va. 225, 23 S.E.2d 613 (1942).
120. Brief for Petitioner at 36, Minano v. State, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985); Brief
for Respondent Lord at 10-11, Minano v. State, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985). More-
over, the indictment did not even specify that property was taken. Rather, it was
framed in the statutory language of "taking or attempted taking" of property.




structions on those offenses indicated by the vague, untested factual
account in the indictment.
A. Deficiencies of the Related Offense Approach
A close examination of the related offense approach as applied by
the court of appeals in Minano illustrates the difficulties inherent in
that approach. These difficulties strongly suggest that Alaska should
retain the "necessary inclusion" requirement of Alaska Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 31(c). First, the related offense approach as applied in
Minano expands the lesser-included offense doctrine beyond the
bounds of its usefulness. In fairness, none of the courts adopting the
related offense standard have confronted a situation like that in
Minano where a lesser crime contained an intent element that required
an equal level of culpability with the greater crime, yet the actions
intended differed in the two offenses.122 Although Minano is the first
related offense case to address this issue, the similar culpability/differ-
ent actions distinction highlights an important difference between the
evidence and related offense approaches. Almost by definition, crimes
that involve intent elements which are equally culpable yet which in-
volve different objectives could not satisfy the requirement of neces-
sary inclusion. If the lesser offense has a specific intent requirement
different from that of the greater crime, it would always be possible for
the defendant to have committed the greater crime without also com-
mitting the lesser. Nevertheless, the related offense approach would
apply to permit a lesser-included offense instruction in such situations.
This result is contrary to the purposes of the lesser-included offense
doctrine which was not intended to apply to crimes with lesser punish-
ments but equal culpability.
Second, the related offense approach increases the potential for
confusing a jury. Once again, the Minano case illustrates this short-
coming. If the trial court in Minano was allowed to give an instruction
on theft, the jury would have been required to determine a factual
issue that was not litigated by the parties - whether the defendants
122. In Minano, the court of appeals suggested that the California courts had dealt
with a similiar dilemma and had concluded that vandalism was a related offense to the
crime of burglary. Minano, 690 P.2d at 33 n.7 (interpreting People v. Geiger, 35
Cal.3d 510, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1984)). A closer examination of Cali-
fornia's statutes, however, reveals the error of the Alaska Court of Appeals. The Cali-
fornia Penal Code defines vandalism as malicious damage of property. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 594(a) (West Supp. 1986). Malicious is defined as involving the intent "to
vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act." Id. § 7.4
(West 1970). California courts have interpreted malice as requiring only a general and
not a specific intent to harm. People v. Bohmer, 46 Cal. App. 3d 185, 120 Cal. Rptr.
136 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975). Vandalism, therefore,
does not require a greater or a different criminal intent from the crime of burglary.
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intended to permanently deprive the cab driver of his cab. During the
Minano trial, the defendants introduced substantial evidence of mental
defects and alcohol dependency to support the argument that they
were not capable of the advance planning required to commit assault
for the purpose of taking the cab. 123 The prosecutor rebutted the evi-
dence of diminished capacity by introducing evidence indicating that
the defendants were capable of deciding to hit the cab driver and drive
off in the cab.' 24 The prosecutor did not attempt to prove and would
have had a more difficult task proving that the defendants intended to
permanently deprive the cab driver of his cab. This would entail dem-
onstrating that the defendants "were capable of forming an intent as to
the ultimate disposition of the cab several days later."' 25 Although
some circumstantial evidence was presented from which the jury could
find an intent to permanently deprive the cab driver of the cab,' 26 the
jury's ability to reach a conclusion on this issue would require it to
weigh the circumstantial evidence against the evidence of lack of capa-
bility without the guidance of arguments by counsel.
In addition to increasing the potential for jury confusion, focusing
the jury's attention on this circumstantial evidence would divert it
from consideration of the issues crucial to the prosecution's argument
on the greater crime. Although in Minano the prosecution had offered
additional evidence concerning the related offense, in general, the re-
lated offense doctrine provides incentives to defendants to focus the
jury's attention on the lesser offenses. Defendants are encouraged to
offer as wide a range of evidence as possible and to engage in specula-
tive arguments about the conclusions such evidence warrants. The ef-
fort necessary to restrain defendants from converting the trial into a
wide-ranging inquiry into every possible offense the defendant may
have committed would significantly burden trial courts.
Moreover, the requirement that both the greater and the lesser
offenses relate to the protection of the same interests, which is sup-
posed to limit potential misuse of the related offense doctrine, also suf-
fers from practical difficulties that greatly diminish its usefulness. 127
To determine whether two offenses protect the same interests, courts
have looked for similar statutory language 128 and a close relationship
123. Brief for Petitioner at 36-37, Minano v. State, 710 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1985).
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id.
126. Minano, 690 P.2d at 33.
127. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("In the ab-
sence of such restraint defense counsel might be tempted to press the jury for leniency
by requesting lesser included offense instructions on every lesser crime that could ar-
guably be made out from any evidence that happened to be introduced at trial.").
128. See United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1977) (court will look
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of the offenses in the criminal code.129 At first glance, this require-
ment seems helpful, but Minano illustrates that in reality it is ex-
tremely difficult to apply and may lead to arbitrary results.
If the Minano court of appeals decision was implictly stating that
robbery and theft protect the same interests, 130 it would be difficult to
reconcile Minano with court of appeals decisions both prior to and
subsequent to Minano. In Nell v. State, 131 the court indicated that in
Alaska the criminalization of theft and of robbery do not protect the
same interests: "From the face of the statute it is clear that the legisla-
ture, in passing this robbery statute, intended to emphasize the fact
that robbery is a crime against the person aid deemphasize the theft
aspects of the offense." 132 The opinion further noted that "[r]obbery is
placed in the criminal code with other offenses against the person,
rather than placed with other property offenses." 133
Moreover, in Reynolds v. State, 134 a case decided subsequent to
Minano, the state's evidence "consisted almost entirely of proof estab-
lishing his guilt of theft: that he was in possession of property recently
stolen in the burglary." 135 A real question remained as to whether the
defendant committed the entry necessary for the charged crime of bur-
glary. Thus, the facts of Reynolds present a classic case for allowing a
lesser-included offense instruction. A jury convinced that Reynolds
committed the theft would be likely to convict him of burglary even
though it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he com-
mitted the entry. Indeed, under the evidence approach a lesser-in-
cluded offense instruction would be allowed in this case because any
commission of burglary under the facts of this case necessarily in-
cluded a theft.136
Under the related offense test, however, the appropriateness of a
lesser-included offense instruction is less clear. Like robbery, the gra-
at "similar language ... [and] the close relationship of the two offenses in the text of
the statute").
129. See id.; State v. Kupau, 620 P.2d 250, 254 (Hawaii 1980).
130. See Minano, 690 P.2d at 33.
131. 642 P.2d 1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). See also Hawthorne v. State, 501 P.2d
155, 157 n.6 (Alaska 1972) (recognizing but not evaluating the argument that the
gravamen of robbery and theft are different).
132. Id. at 1366.
133. Id. at 1365 n.6.
134. 706 P.2d 708 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
135. Id. at 710.
136. In People v. Dace, 104 Ill. 2d 96, 103, 470 N.E.2d 993, 996 (1984), the court
applied the evidence approach to allow theft as a lesser-included offense of burglary
when theft was established by the evidence at trial. See also supra text accompanying
notes 60-63 for a discussion of the related offense approach as being underinclusive as
well as overinclusive.
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vamen of burglary is not the theft. 137 It is the breaking and entering.
Even though the offenses of burglary and theft are placed in the same
chapter of the criminal code, offenses against property, it can be per-
suasively argued that the nature of the property protected, real prop-
erty instead of personal property, is sufficiently different to distinguish
between the societal interests at stake.
If the court of appeals had accepted the above analysis, it would
have been forced to conclude that its same interest analysis in Minano
was incorrect, if the Minano opinion is properly read as concluding
that the offenses of theft and robbery protect the same societal inter-
ests. Instead, the Reynolds court further confused its same interest
analysis by relying on the fact that the offenses of theft and burglary
have not merged. 138 It concluded that because separate sentences
could be imposed for both crimes, their basic social purpose must be
too different to permit the lesser-included offense doctrine to oper-
ate.139 The difficulties in applying the same interest test, which is an
integral part of the related offense approach, further highlight the defi-
ciencies of that approach.
In sum, the court of appeals' opinions in Minano and its progeny
demonstrate that the related offense doctrine is very vague and diffi-
cult for appellate courts as well as trial courts to apply. Moreover,
even if correctly applied, the doctrine produces undesirable results.
The related offense approach often confronts juries with a large
number of alternative charges, some of which contain issues that the
parties have not litigated. Additionally, the related offense doctrine
removes the traditional building block relationship between lesser and
greater offenses and allows instructions when offenses have a some-
137. Some courts have concluded that an analysis of the gravamen of the offenses is
not relevant in deciding which offenses may be included in the charged offense. In
Anderson v. State, 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), the Florida district court
noted that breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny and breaking
and entering with intent to commit wiretapping have the same gravamen - breaking
and entering. Id. at 555. The court found little factual relationship between the of-
fenses, however, and asserted that introducing evidence of wiretapping in a larceny
prosecution would "unjustly prejudice the state." Id.
138. Reynolds, 706 P.2d at 711.
139. Id. This reference to merger is irrelevant to the question of whether a lesser-
included offense instruction should be granted. In United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d
1224 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit argued persuasively that the policies giving
rise to the lesser-included offense doctrine and double jeopardy differ sufficiently to
justify different results on any given set of facts. "The critical concern located at the
core of the Double Jeopardy Clause is that a person should have to stand but once
before the power and resources of the state, accused of an offense." Id. at 1240 (citing
Gresen v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). The concern of the lesser-
included offense doctrine is that the jury should have an alternative to the harsh
choice between guilt or innocence if such alternatives are comprehensible to the jury
and supported by the evidence.
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what attenuated connection. Finally, the doctrine diverts the jury's
attention from the original charge and thereby impedes resolution of
the primary issue.
B. Recommendation: Adoption of the Evidence Approach
The standard announced by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Minano, a modified pleadings approach, is unclear and unworkable.
Because Alaska now emphasizes simplicity in pleading, 140 indictments
have become shorter and more generally drafted.141 Thus, a pleadings
analysis in Alaska would yield results similar to the strict statutory
approach - a very restricted list of lesser-included offenses.
The main advantage of the pleadings approach, as recognized by
the supreme court in Elisovsky, 142 is that it provides defendants with
adequate notice of the charges against which they must defend them-
selves.143 This advantage can be retained by requiring the pleadings
analysis for prosecutors making requests yet allowing a broader stan-
dard when defendants make such requests. Alaska has never distin-
guished between the ability of the prosecutor and the defendant to
invoke the doctrine, but the distinction is easily defensible. A defend-
ant's liberty interest suggests the need for significant protection, and
the prosecutor is not harmed by appropriately granted lesser-included
offense instructions. The prosecutor still is guaranteed full jury con-
sideration of the crime originally charged and is able to fulfill his duty
of protecting society if the jury convicts the defendant of a lesser of-
fense that more closely matches the defendant's conduct.
The evidence approach allows more realistic grants of lesser-in-
cluded offense instructions requested by the defendant because it fo-
cuses on the facts of each individual case. The evidence approach thus
furthers the underlying policy of lesser-included offense instructions to
grant alternatives to juries faced with the harsh choices of guilt or
innocence. It does not, however, allow defendants to offer juries a
"shopping list of alternatives" 144 which could confuse them and bur-
den the court system. The standard of "necessary inclusion" can be
140. See Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350, 1367 (Alaska 1977) (role of indictment
to give notice to defendant is viewed less strictly in Alaska because of free availability
of grand jury transcripts); see also Christian v. State, 513 P.2d 664, 664-67 (Alaska
1973).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
142. Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Alaska 1979) ("This approach fo-
cuses closely on the facts charged in the indictment to determine whether the defend-
ant had actual notice of possible lesser included offenses.")(emphasis added).
143. See supra note 1 for a discussion of a defendant's constitutional right to notice
of the charges against him.
144. People v. Geiger, 35 Cal. 3d 510, 514, 674 P.2d 1303, 1304, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45,
46 (1984).
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clearly comprehended and applied by the trial courts and the building
block relationship of the two offenses sets a framework for jury
analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Alaska Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Minano halted
the historical progression of Alaska's lesser-included offense doctrine.
The related offense approach rejected by the supreme court contains
vague, uncertain criteria of little guidance to trial courts struggling to
implement it. Additionally, focusing the jury's attention on the rela-
tionship of the interests protected by certain offenses rather than on
the factual relationship of the offenses requires the jury to decide issues
not litigated by the parties and removes the building block framework
that typically highlights areas of factual dispute. The result of instruc-
tions on related offenses is more likely to be irrational, inconsistent
jury opinions than the deliberate opinions the doctrine was intended to
promote.
Along with rejecting the related offense doctrine, the Minano
court revised the evidence approach being applied by Alaska courts.
The modified pleadings approach it articulated is somewhat unclear.
The approach does not specify whether all the essential facts of the
lesser offense must be specifically pleaded in the indictment for the
greater offense or if it is sufficient that such facts are fairly implied
from the indictment. Moreover, the modified pleadings approach se-
verely restricts the number of potential lesser-included offenses. No
persuasive reason exists for applying it to requests by defendants.
The evidence approach is a better standard for the Alaska courts
to apply to lesser-included offense instructions requested by defend-
ants. Because the evidence approach focuses on the facts as estab-
lished at trial and not on whether such facts happened to be included
in the indictment, it results in a closer match between the defendant's
illegal conduct and the crime for which he is convicted.
Nancy L. Eisenschmied
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